








~~~~4.r i~imqiiiniiinuigniyui~iinyiiiiiiN,iiiSTRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND DZVERSIFICA-





STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND DIVERSIFICATION
IN MINERAL EXPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES










Structural adjustment and diversification in mineral exporting developing
countries - The case oP Zambia
~ 1. Introduction.
For mineral exporting developing countries (MEDCs) the major factor
necessitating adjustment policies in the late seventies~early eighties are
the lower commodity prices in real terms as compared to the previous
decade. Structural adjustment becomes necessary when the fall in prices is
no longer regarded as a temporary fluctustion but rather as a reflection
of the secular trend. Zn addition, mineral exporting countries may have to
anticipate the future depletion of the mineral resource.
More as a derivation of the two factors mentioned above, structural ad-
justment is needed to allow for high debt service obligations, deterior-
ated terms of trade, price distortions and slow growth in the OECD coun-
tries.l) Postponement of structural adjustment in response to falling
mineral prices, led to mounting debt service obligations. The
deterioration of the terms of trade is a direct consequence of falling
mineral prices and the wlnerability of MEDCs to external shocks.2) Price
distortions already occurred in the period of relatively high mineral
prices, in accordance with the theory on the 'Dutch Disease'. The slow
growth in the OECD countries following oil price increases in the 197Os
not only diminished demand for mineral exports but also decreased the
opportunities for alternative ways to earn foreign exchange.
These structural factors resulted in balance of payments deficits, slow or
negative growth rates and government budget deficits. The latter are of
special relevance in MEDCs because of the strong fiscal linkage which
characterizes these economies (as compared to agricultural exporters).3)
The unsustainability of the imbalances in the 1980s msde structural
adjustment inevitable. The falling revenues from mineral exports being
regarded as the major structural change, the challenge is to compensate3
for the shortfall in foreign exchange receipts. This can be brought about
by a contraction in spending on tradable goods or by an expansion in the
production of these goods. The former is associated with a restrictive
fiscal and monetary policy (expenditure reduction) while the latter
requires intervention in the real exchange rate (expenditure switching).
Both require major changes in production and consumption patterns.
The rising debt repayment obligations and changes in the external
environment such as increasing prices of imports and increased interest
rates put additional pressure on the implementation of these measures.
More severe interventions will therefore be needed to allow not only for
the falling revenues from minerals but also for this deterioration in the
external environment.
Interventions should necessarily be directed towards the traded goods
sector. Because only in this sector, compensation can be found for the
deteriorated external environment. As stated before, adjustment policies
in general consist of two parts: expenditure reduction and expenditure
switching policy. As the IMF puts it: in general, external balance cannot
be simultaneously achieved (with internal balance) without employing at
least two separate policy instruments, one acting to reduce domestic
expenditure and the other to change the composition of foreign and
domestic expenditure between foreign and domestic goods.4j Expenditure
reduction can be achieved through fiscal and monetary policy. Measures to
induce expenditure switching include exchange rate adjustments, import
restrictions and tax or subsidy schemes. The IMF prefers the former
because other measures tend to result ín inefficient patterns of resource
use.
The success of adjustment policies largely depends on the mixture of both
kinds of policy measures and the consequences on wages, prices, interest
rates, imports, tariffs and credits. Furthermore, wi.thin the macro-econo-
mic framework which is characterised by both kinds of policies, policy
makers may wish to emphasise the development of certain sectors in the
economy and~or to influence the distribution of income. So, apart from the
macro-economic combination of adjustment measures, the success of the4
program will depend on its impact on sectoral developments. A third factor
will be the unexpected changes in the external environment such as sudden
shocks in commodity prices.
The starting point for this analysis will be the combination of
expenditure reduction and switching policies. The extent to which these
policies work their way through the mineral dependent economy brings us to
developments on a sectoral level end to variables such as wages, credit
expansion, investment, prices etc. After looking at the theoretical
aspects of adjustment policy in the next paragraph (paragraph 2),
adjustment problems and policies of the mineral dependent economy of
Zambia will be analysed extensively (paragraph 3).
The Zambian economy is traditionally characterised by a large comparative
advsntage in mineral exports. The advantage decreases when depletion is
expected in the foreseeable future and mining has already shifted to lower
grade ores. This situation is aggravated by falling output prices. The
economy now has to change over from a situation in which foreign exchange
came in relatively easy to a situation where new comparative advantages
have to be identified and exploited. It is most likely that these
advantages will be less explicit as compared to copper mining. Thus,
adjustment should be implemented to induce a reduction in production costs
to make other exports internationally competitive.
These considerations briefly illustrate the huge problems a mineral
exporting country like Zambia faces in its effort to change over from a
relatively comfortable foreign exchange position to a situation in which
other resources have to be exploited. The prospects for other exports than
copper are further frustrated by transport problems and high transport
costs of landlocked Zambia. The comparative advantage of high grade copper
ores could easily compensate for these transport costs. For other exports,
however, compensation has to be found in lower production costs. On the
other hand, high transport costs form a strong natural protection for the
import-competing sector.5
Paragraph 3 analyses the nature of the problems and prospects of a change
over from the mineral dependent economy of Zambia to a more diversified
economy. The analysis is based on the theoretical considerations about
adjustment in MEDCs of paragraph 2.
Paragraph 3 is subdivided in several sections in accordance with the
emphasis put on different aspects of adjustment policy. After 19~4, Zambia
saw its terms of trade deteriorate but was able to secure external finance
for its current account deficit. In the period until 1980 (paragraph
3.2) some expenditure reduction and switching measures were implemented
but only to a relatively small extent in the hope that copper príces would
recover from their fall in 19~5. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be
drawn based on the success of devaluation and fiscal~monetary restriction.
In the 1980s the policy of borrowing and postponing adjustment became
unsustainable and Zambia had to subordinate itself to conditions imposed
by the IMF. Until the end of 1985 (paragraph 3.3) the emphasis was placed
on a monetary restrictive policy. After 1985 until the break with the
current IMF program in 198~, when foreign exchange was auctioned,
switching policy was the major device. This period will be analysed in
paragraph 3.4. After the break with the IMF in May 198~, Zambia has
reimposed a fixed exchange rate and price control measures. The period can
hardly be described in terms of structural adjustment but gives the
impression of crisis management to cope with the reduced availability of
foreign exchange. Paragraph 3.5 describes some of the measures the
government is taking to improve the economy. In section 4 conclusions will
be drawn. The paper starts with the theoretical aspects of expenditure
reduction (paragraph 2.2) and expenditure switching (paragraph 2.3)
policies.
g 2. Expenditure reduction policy and expenditure switching policy.
~ 2.1. Introduction.
Starting point for the analysis in this paragraph is a situation with a
current account deficit in a MEDC. The deficit is assumed to be caused by6
a deterioration in the terms of trade. Initially, the country can postpone
any adjustment and finance the deficit from external sources or run down
its reserves. This means that the country actually starts to 'live beyond
its means'. If the deterioration in terms of trade is not reversed, the
deficit will become unsustainable, either because available reserves
become exhausted or external finance can no longer be secured. This means
that something has to be done internally. From paragraph 1 it is already
clear that there are basically two types of policies to counteract current
account deficits: expenditure reduction and expenditure switching
policies. The former seeks to reduce excess spending over income thus
improving the balance of payments situation indirectly while the latter
directly seeks to reduce imports and increase exports. It is generally
accepted that both policies form the nucleus of the adjustment process and
that a proper combination of the two is the best approach to counteract a
persistant current account deficit. Problems arise when decisions have to
be taken on the policy mix and on ways and means to minimise the negative
(social) consequences of adjustment policies.
IMF programs emphasise expenditure reduction policy to remedy a current
account deficit because '...it is generally easier to reduce absorption
than to increase production. For this reason, policies affecting
absorption are often first put in place when a rapid decline in a current
account deficit is mandatory'.5) Expenditure switching policy in these
programs is rather to be considered as supportive to the general aim of
expenditure reduction. Devaluations are mainly used to discourage imports
and to improve the viability of the mineral export sector.6) The main
objective of devaluation in Fund programs is therefore to support
expenditure reduction, not primarily to induce expenditure switching. This
emphasis on expenditure reduction policy may be influenced by the
different time horizon of both policies. While expenditure reduction
policy is directed towards short term results, expenditure switching
policy contains the more structural elements of adjustment and takes a
longer period of time to yield results. Therefore, the World Bank can play
a critical role in the formulation of adjustment policies by emphasizing
the structural elements in it. A Bank program contributes to a Fund
program in that it '...permits the Fund to rely less on demand restraintmeasures in restoring external equilibrium, and thus in turn reduces the
likelyhood that Fund-supported programs would adversely affect growth in
the short term'.~)This discussion illustrates that, despite the
acceptance of a combination of both policies to remedy current account
deficits, the emphasis put on certain aspects of the adjustment policy
plays a critical role.
~ 2.2. Expenditure reduction policy.
In a country which is faced with a current account deficit, expenditure
reduction policy mainly aims at removing excess spending over income.
Secondary objectives may be a reduction of inflation and an increase in
savings. The major instrument for this policy is a reduction in credit
supply. The underlying assumption of this policy is that the deficit on
current account is caused by excess spending over income. One might argue
that the deficit is not caused by excessive spending but rather by a
deterioration of income. But in case a country cannot influence the income
side, e.g. because minerals prices have declined, solutions have to be
found on the spending side. This indicates that an expenditure reduction
policy is a short term policy to improve the current account balance. It
does not primarily aim at changing the structure of the economy in the
long run, although it may be beneficial for the restructuring process.
The logic of the argument for a contraction of spending seems obvious. The
success of the policy, however, depends largely on the way it is implemen-
ted. The broad instrument of credit restraint should be further specified
for sectors and categories of expenditure. In a MEDC, the government is
likely to be the main source of excess spending. Because of the strong
fiscal linkage with the mining sector, government income is highly
dependent on mineral revenues. When prices of minerals decline, (as was
the case in the mid seventies and for most minerals again in the early
eighties) government revenues from the mining sector decline even more
rapidly. Large budget deficits result and reductions in government
spending become inevitable (unless the tax burden is increased). An
expenditure reduction policy in this situation is thus directed towards a8
reduction of the government budget deficit through credit constraints from
the banking institutions.
Despite the general objective of reducing the budget deficit, governments
may still be able to secure the larger part of scarce credits at the cost
of credits to the private sector. Within the private sector, the same kind
of transfer of the credit restraint problem takes place between large
scale industries on the one hand and small scale industries (and
households) on the other. The latter would in the end bear the brunt of
the overall credit restraint.8j Similarly, expenditure reduction through
credit restraint is not necessarily directed towards consumption but may
hamper investments as well (including productive government investments).
If the credit squeeze is not adequately rationed, companies may even lack
resources to finance their working capital, let alone new investments. To
cope with these distributional issues, the IMF usually proposes to define
a norm for credit supply to the private sector. In practice, however, the
minimum level of private sector credit is mostly not achieved because '...
these excercises are subordinated to the central objective of controlling
overal credit expansion'.9)
The Fund relates private sector demand for credit to the national income.
National income, however, may be affected by the credit crunch through a
lack of credit for working capital and because of a reduction in aggregate
demand.l~) The latter not only affects imports and exportables, but also
demand for import substitutes and non-traded goods.
In support of the restrictive monetary policy, interest rates could be
increased. This will encourage domestic savings and consequently increase
supply of capital. In addition, it may have the beneficial effects of
reducing consumption expenditure and discouraging capital intensive
investments. On the other hand, however, the costs of capital increase
which may affect investment decisions. Furthermore, increased interest
rates affect government expenditure in a way that it increases interest
payments to the banking system. It may thus contribute to an increase in
the budget deficit.9
With a fall in aggregate demand and a lack of working capital, a credit
squeeze will have an overall contractionary effect on the economy. Both
producers of traded and non-traded goods will be affected by it while the
instrument mainly aims at reducing domestic spending on traded goods. The
traded goods sector is then expected to use its excess capacity for an
increase in exports. The possibilities for this increase, however, will,
among others, depend on the competitiveness of the sector. The expenditure
reduction policy by itself does not provide incentives for the traded
goods sector, unless it is assumed that prices of non-traded goods will
fall in response to demand reduction. Theoretically, this makes it
possible to reach complete adjustment without exchange rate
devaluation.ll~ In practice, however, there will be some kind of downward
price rigidity and domestic producers will be reluctant to lower their
prices. A reduction in spending will thus lead to excess supply and
unemployment. While the policy may lead to an improvement in the external
balance, internally the economy actually contracts. To stimulate domestic
production under demand contraction, the price relation between traded and
non-traded goods should be changed. A devaluation of the exchange rate
will lower the price for non-traded relative to traded goods. The
production costs of the latter sector decrease in terms of output prices,
which may encourage the sector to expand. The traded goods sector may thus
be able to compensate for loss of employment and output in the non-traded
goods sector, which is an unevitable result of expenditure reduction
policy. An expenditure reduction policy, therefore, should be supported by
expenditure switching policy.
It is concluded that an expenditure reduction policy on its own is likely
to lead to contraction in the economy. The policy is biased towards a
short term reversal of current account deficits. When the public sector is
seen as the main source of excessive domestic demand, which is most likely
in MEDCs, expenditure reduction will primarily affect this sector.
Besides, the increased scarcity of credit and probably its higher price
requires additional and more specific measures to ensure distribution of
credit to be in line with national priorities.10
~ 2.3. Expenditure switching policy.
Expenditure switching policy is preferably effected through exchange rate
devaluation. This may shift expenditure to domestically produced goods
while resources will be diverted to production of traded goods. The major
short term objective of expenditure switching policy in a situation of
unsustainable current account deficits is to reduce imports. In the medium
term it may also have the more important effect of increased production of
traded goods, both import substitutes and exports. It implicitly means a
greater openness of the economy which does not necessarily mean export
orientation since expansion of the traded goods sector may to a large
extent be found in the import-substitution sector.
The reduction of imports through devaluation depends on the demand elasti-
city of the price for imports. For countries which have been experiencing
current account deficits for years, the elasticity tends to be low because
these countries have already been forced to ration their imports.
Devaluation will, however, certainly lead to a contraction of spending on
domestically produced goods because it raises the prices of traded goods
which implies a reduction of real income (income effect).
The other objective of an expenditure switching policy is to encourage
the production of traded goods. The traded goods sector can in this way
compensate for the contractionary effects of both expenditure reduction
and expenditure switching policies. But, more important, the sector should
broaden the country's export base and make it less dependent on imports.
This is the more structural aspect of the adjustment process. It should
enable the country to respond to decreasing (mineral) export revenues and,
eventually, to increasing debt repayment obligations.
The expenditure switching policy, to be effected through nominal
devaluations, is most likely to lead to a contraction of output in the
non-traded goods sector. This sector sees its costs rising especially if
traded goods are used as inputs, while demand decreases because of the
income effect. On the other hand it may benefit from a substitution effect
of demand from traded goods to non-traded goods because of the price11
increase in the former sector. The net result, however, most likely being
negative, economic activity will change over from the non-traded goods
sector to the traded goods sector. This change over requires flexibility
in the economy and a longer time period than an expenditure reduction
policy to yield results with respect to the current account.
The success of an expenditure switching policy depends on several factors:
the extent to which prices in the non-traded goods sector and wages
increase following the devaluation, the viability and exploitation of
other export oriented activities, the capacity utilisation in the traded
goods sector, the international competitiveness of the import substitution
sector and the availability of credits to the traded goods sector. These
factors will be analysed below with special reference to MEDCs.
Devaluation will almost inevitably lead to a higher inflation rate in the
economy since it raises prices of traded goods. Parts of the inflationary
effect may be counteracted by abolishing import tariffs at the same time.
This will prevent import prices from rising in accordance with the
devaluation. But it may not be sufficient to prevent inflationary pressure
on the economy. An increase in the general price level can only be
prevented by lower prices of non-traded goods due to demand contraction.
This is not likely to happen for the same reasons as mentioned in the
foregoing section and, in addition, because producers of non-traded goods
will be confronted with rising input prices. If, however, prices of non-
traded goods rise at the same rate as prices of traded goods, the effect
of devaluation on the latter sector will be nullified. The traded goods
sector will see its costs rise to the same extent as output prices and its
competitiveness will decrease. To prevent prices of non-traded goods from
risíng, a expenditure reduction policy is necessary. So, here again the
need to combine expenditure switching policy and expenditure reduction
policy is stressed.
The same kind of reasoning can be applied to wage increases. If wages are
allowed to rise following a devaluation, the traded goods sector will not
benefit fully from the devaluation. Zn practice, devaluation will most
likely lead to a fall in real wages. MEDCs, however, tend to be high wage12
economíes.12) The mining sector is usually the wage leader, especially
during times of high mineral prices. Strong miners unions are able to
secure wage increases which spread over to the rest of the economy. The
wage level in these countries is therefore typically relatively high.
Subsequently, in a period of adjustment, devaluation can be considered as
a measure to bring down the real wage rate. However, a devaluation will
also raise or restore profitability in the mining sector which may provoke
new wage demands by the miners. A reduction in real wages is thus more
necessary in MEDCs but at the same time more difficult to achieve.
MEDCs that have been relying for years on their mineral resource for
export earnings will have limited experience with export markets.
Identification and exploitation of other comparative advantages is thus
likely to take considerable time. At the same time, managerial skills
have to be developed in the field of exports other than minerals.
Providing incentives through a devaluation therefore requires additional
measures to bring about the desired expansion of exports.
If the traded goods sector is actually working with excess capacity, pro-
duction expansion can be realised without large new investment expendi-
ture. In that case, domestic producers of traded goods may be able to
respond in the short term to the incentive of devaluation.
Expansion of output in the import substitution sector, however, is
hampered by the contractionary effects on spending of both expenditure
switching and expenditure reduction policies. This sector may thus be
induced to search for export markets for its products. In MEDCs,
however, the international competitiveness of the import substitution
sector may be questioned. Protection, together with the high capital
intensity of many industries in these countries, makes the sector not very
efficient. Devaluations (together with tariff reforms) do not guarantee a
viable position of this sector. A change over to exports may, therefore,
not be feasible for a large part of the import substitution sector. The
expansion of this sector must be found in production of importables which
become increasingly expensive because of the devaluation. For this kind ofexpansion, new investments will be needed, with the exception of product
lines with excess capacity.
From the factors mentioned above, it is clear that a large part of the
expansion of the traded goods sector must be found in new investments.
This outcome tends to conflict wíth the instrument of credit restriction
under an expenditure reduction policy. So, although the traded goods
sector sees its opportunities to expand improve, it may not be able to
find finance to do so. This will put additional pressure on the
distribution of credit under adjustment programs. Expenditure switching
will also increase the need for external finance in the adjustment period.
Finally, the effects of expenditure switching on the distribution of
income should be taken into consideration. As mentioned above, real wages
are likely to decrease under this policy. But the effects may differ for
different categories of workers. Workers involved in the production of
traded goods, where value added in terms of output prices increases, may
be able to secure wage increases. T'heir real wage will further depend on
the share of traded goods in their consumption basket. In the non-traded
goods sector, however, contraction prevails and workers may be confronted
with unemployment, at least in the short term, and decreases in their real
wages. In the medium term, the total effect depends on the output response
of the traded goods sector. Even when it is assumed that production in the
traded goods sector will eventually expand and compensation is found for
unemployed workers from the non-traded goods sector, additional policy
measures are needed in the short run to protect the most wlnerable social
groups. This protection, although a major governmental task, is likely to
be jeopardised by its objective to reduce the budget deficit.
From this section it is clear that an expenditure switching policy on its
own will not bring about the desired improvement in the current account
balance. It has to be supported by expenditure reduction policy to
minimise the inflationary impact of devaluation. Furthermore, measures
should be taken to enable the traded goods sector to expand.14
~ 2.4. A combinatíon of expenditure reduction and expenditure switching
policies.
From a macro-economic perspective, a combination of expenditure reduction
and expenditure switching policies seems to be the most promising
adjustment policy. Both policies will reinforce each other, but there are
also areas of conflict. Through its income effect, the expenditure
switching policy reinforces demand reduction. This may lead to a
relaxation of the restrictive fiscal~monetary policy needed to achieve
external balance.
Conversely, expenditure reduction policy may lead to lower prices of non-
traded goods. It thus adds to the objectives of expenditure switching
policy. This effect, however, has been excluded here.
Conflicts arise with regard to inflation, credit supply and austerity, to
mention some of these. While expenditure reduction policy aims at reducing
inflation, expenditure switching policy tends to raise the domestic price
level. The desired expansion of traded goods production following the
devaluation conflicts with the objective of reducing credit supply under
expenditure reduction policy. The austerity measures to reduce the budget
deficit must be brought in line with the need to protect wlnerable socisl
groups during the period of adjustment, i.e. until the expenditure
switching policy starts to yield results.
Both kinds of policies have a different time horizon. Expenditure
reduction policy will have an immediate impact on the government budget
deficit, aggregate demand and the current account deficit. A policy to
encourage expansion of output in the traded goods sector will take years
to yield results. The only short term effect on output may be an
improvement in capacity utilisation. For a further expansion, new areas of
investment need to be identified. It may take a few years before new
production facilities are in full operation. Output expansion in
agricultural activities may take less time to be realised. Especially in
MEDCs, with a high food component in total imports, agricultural
development should be emphasized in the adjustment period. The different15
time horizons of both policies give rise to questions about the timing
of implementation. An expenditure switching policy should support an
expenditure reduction policy because of the contractionary effect of the
latter. This effect, however, will be immediate while the positive results
of devaluation on output are expected to occur in a later stage. In the
meantime, the contractionary effect of demand reduction should be
minimised. Increased donor support to maintain a certain level of
aggregate demand until expansion of the traded goods sector is realised
may help to overcome this problem of timing.
Inflation is another area in which both policies are not fully complemen-
tary. Expenditure reduction policy through credit restraint and public
sector austerity will mitigate inflation by reducing aggregate demand.
Under an expenditure switching policy, however, inflation is, by
definition, caused by cost-push factors. It raises prices of traded goods
whíle prices of non-traded goods may also rise to the extent that traded
goods are used as inputs. Therefore, expenditure reduction policy in a
period of devaluations, may not be sufficient to prevent prices of non-
traded goods from rising. This is partly a matter of timing, for it may
take some time before all prices in the economy have responded to the new
exchange rate. Prices for exports and imports will respond sooner than
prices for import substitutes and non-traded goods. Moreover, since non-
traded goods are not fully produced out of traded inputs, there is no
reason why prices of non-traded goods should rise at the same rate as
traded goods.
It is concluded that, in order to combine an expenditure reductíon policy
with a perspective of growth and employment, it should be implemented
simultaneously with an expenditure switching policy. For countries with
acute and severe balance of payments problems, it is tempting to consider
the current account deficit as the major problem to be solved and to
device a policy mix accordingly. However, making an expenditure reduction
policy the cornerstone of adjustment in MEDCs, one runs the risk of
prolongued economic contraction and increases in unemployment and poverty.
Multilateral financial institutions tend to urge for measures which
directly influence the current account position of debtor countries. This16
may lead to unbalanced attention for an expenditure reduction policy and a
neglect of other objectives than the inmediate reduction of a current
account deficit. On the other hand, an expenditure switching policy,
particularly in a country with a low import price elasticity, will not
result in substantial improvements in the current account in the short
run. It takes time and external assistance for the expenditure switching
policy to take effect in terms of an expansion of the traded goods sector.
The best policy mix can only be judged upon in the actual situation of a
particular country. It may therefore be useful to analyse how a mineral
exporting developing country like Zambia has combined these two policies




The Zambian economy is characterised by its dependence on mineral exports.
At the end of colonial rule in 1964, copper accounted for 95 percent of
export earnings while exports made up 60 percent of GDP. The decline in
copper prices after 19~5 had a severe impact on the economy. However,
adjustment could be postponed until the beginning of the 1980s. By that
time, the country had to adjust not only to falling terms of trade but
also to increased debt service obligations. The emphasis of adjustment was
initially on expenditure reduction policies. After 1985, with the
introduction of a foreign exchange auction, expenditure switching became
the dominant policy. Zambia may thus fit into the theoretical framework as
outlined above.
At Independance, the manufacturing sector held a share in Zambian GDP of
only six percent. Between 1963 and 1966, copper prices increased by almost
125 percent in real terms and remained relatively stable until 19~4, with
a small dip during 1971 and 1972. Real GDP grew on average by 5.6 percent
annually between 1965 and 1974. The dependence on copper exports, however,
is only one aspect of the general dependence of Zambia on external17
factors. Apart from copper prices, the development of Zambia is to a large
extent determined by such factors as weather conditions, oil prices and
geographic location. Major aspects of the latter are the liberation
struggle in neighbouring Zimbabwe, the frontline position vis a vis South
Africa and the long and partly unreliable transport routes to the harbours
in the region.
Between 1965 and 1974, the government influence on the economy increased.
In 1969, the fiscal linkage between mining revenues and government income
was reinforced when the government became the major shareholder in mining
activities. The country embarked on an import-substitution strategy which
was biased towards providing inputs for the mines and production of final
consumer goods. Investments were directed towards large scale capital
intensive production. After 1969, public investment was dominated by the
takeover of existing companies. Government final consumption expenditure
increased from 12 percent of GDP in 1964 to 19 percent in 1974.
Manufacturing output grew on average by more than 10 percent between 1965
and i974, partly because of direct government investments. This figure
contrasts with a growth rate of agricultural output of less than 2 per-
cent. The development policy emphasised growth in the manufacturing sector
which became protected by import barriers. In contrast, agricultural
output remained unprotected and was subject to a government pricing policy
while prices of agricultural inputs increased. The internal barter terms
of trade for the peasant farmer deteriorated by 30 percent between 1964
and 1973.i3)
The share of the tertiary sector as a whole in GDP (at factor costs) in-
creased from 30 percent in 1964 to 35 percent in 1971 and remained stable
thereafter.
The period of high copper prices from 1964 to 1974, shows similarities to
what is generally refered to as the 'Dutch Disease'.i4j The increased
revenues of the booming sector (mining) led to wage increases and, through
the spending effect, to higher prices for non-traded goods. Wage increases
started from the mining sector and were followed by public sector workers
and transport workers. This led to wage increase demands in other sectors
as well. On average, wages of Zambians increased by ten percent a year18
between 1964 and 1974. Between 1964 and 1970, the consumer price index
(which only partly reflects the price increase of non-traded goods)
increased by about 45 percent. This figure compares to an increase in
prices of manufactured goods from industrial market economies (MUV-index)
of only 17 percent.l5) This implies that producers of traded goods in
Zambia (other than minerals) experienced cost increases (wages, non-traded
goods as inputs) in relation to international output prices. In this
period, the nominal exchange rate was fixed and so the real exchange rate
appreciated and the Kwacha became overvalued in terms of prices of
international traded goods.
A resource movement effect, the other symptom of Dutch Disease, cannot be
observed with regard to the mining sector, due to its capital intensity.
On the other hand, the rural-urban migration in Zambia can be regarded as
an aspect of the resource movement effect. Employment creation and a
relatively high wage level in protected and non-traded urban sectors and
deterioration of the terms of trade in rural areas provided major
incentives for this migration. It implied the withdrawal of resources
(labour) from traded goods activities in agriculture. With total
employment in the wage sector increasing by almost 4 percent per annum ín
the boom period, agricultural employment faced an almost zero growth rate.
The urban population has increased at an annual growth rate of about 7.5
percent since 1963 while presently about 50 percent of the population is
living in urban areas. This figure is the highest in sub-Saharan Africa.
In an overview of the boom period the most marked features are high real
growth rates, major efforts by the government to develop educational and
health provisions, urbanisation and increased government control of the
economy. The latter included price controls, subsidies, direct investments
and the takeover of companies. Both non-traded and traded goods sectors
benefitted from increased aggregate demand. But of the latter, only the
protected part was able to adjust its prices to increased domestic costs.
Agricultural pices as well as imports of agricultural products were
regulated by the government, who kept producer prices below import~export
parity. Prices for non-traditional exports are, by definition, related to
internationsl traded goods prices.19
In 1974, copper prices started to fall. In real terms, the copper price
declined by almost 46 percent in 1975. A small improvement occurred in
1979 and 1980, but prices declined even more dramatically thereafter. In
1984, a price level of only 40 percent of the 1974 level (in real terms)
was reached. An improvement in prices has been recorded for 1987 and 1988,
while for 1989 prices are expected to fall slightly. With its
heavy dependence on copper exports, the Zambian economy was extremely hard
hit by the decline in copper prices after 1974.
Compared to 1964, export earnings from copper had fallen by 65 percent in
real terms in 1984. In this year, Zambia earned only 28 percent of its
earnings on copper exports in 1970. In 1974, mineral revenue made up more
than 50 percent of total government revenue. After that year, mineral
revenue accounted for less than 5 percent of total revenue and in some
years even became negative. Together with the fall in prices, copper
production in Zambia declined after 1974. The volume of copper exports in
1986 was more than 30 percent below its 1974 level. According to Unctad
statisticsi6j the purchasing power of exports (defined as the value index
of exports deflated by the import unit value index) had dwindled in 1985
to only 20 percent of its 1974 level.
Until 1980, the economic policy response to falling copper prices can be
characterised by reluctance to adjust to the new situation. Zambia was
able to secure external finance for its current account deficit while
waiting for an economic recovery through an improvement in copper prices.
In the meantime, the government tried to reduce imports by imposing import
quota's and some exchange rate devaluation. Although the late 1970s cannot
be characterised by any specific adjustment policy, the results from
attempts to reduce imports and to change the value of the exchange rate
may be of interest for the analysis of economic policy before and after
1985. After 1980, opportunities for borrowing dried up and the influence
of multilateral institutions like the IMF and the World Bank increased.
The adjustment programs in the years until 1985 focussed on demand
management to reduce the current account deficit. This policy mainly
relied on limiting credit supplies with the aim to reduce the government
budget deficit. Devaluation of the exchange rate was a minor part of the20
programs, with the objective to make imports less attractive. By the end
of 1985, the emphasis switched to an expenditure switching policy, with
the introduction of a weekly foreign exchsnge auction. With some
interruptions, the auction was continued until 1987 when the government
decided to break with the current IMF program.
In the next paragraphs, the implementation and the problems and prospects
of the two types of economic policy, expenditure reduction and expenditure
switching, will be analysed.
~ 3.2. Postponement of adjustment; 1975-1980
The fall in copper prices in 1975 is reflected in a fall in export earn-
ings and in government revenue. As a consequence, real GDP declined by
almost 2.5 percent in 1975. Net savings decreased dramatically. Initially,
there was no reduction in government expenditure in response to falling
revenues. To finance its budget, the government became increasingly
dependent on domestic, and later, foreign borrowing.
Economic policy in the late 1970s focussed on a reduction in import ex-
penditure by means of import restrictions, limited devaluations and
attempts to reduce the budget deficit. The different aspects of these
policies will be outlined below.
Import restrictions such as tariffs had already been imposed before 1975.
The tariff structure aimed at protecting the production of those raw mate-
rials or manufacturers' inputs that were being produced localy or that
could directly be sold to consumers. Essentisl goods and capital goods
were exempted from import levies. This most likely has encouraged
investments in capital intensive production. There were no duties imposed
on basic food and agricultural imports, but imports were strictly
regulated by granting exclusive import rights to large scale (state)
monopolies. The trade policy was thus biased towards industrial production
of final consumer goods and tended to neglect the production of
intermediate goods. Furthermore, the relatively high rate of protection21
allowed domestic producers to raise their prices above import parity,
which had an inflationary effect on the economy.
After 1975, the tariff structure was replaced by more restrictive measures
like quota's and import licences. The priorities as prevailing under the
tariff system remained unchanged. The more severe import restrictions
again have induced price increases in the economy. A reduction in imports
was indeed effected. The volume of imports fell by 30 percent between 1975
and 1980. Apart from the import restrictions, this reduction of imports
was brought about by a reduced availability of foreign exchange,
reductions in government expenditure and the devaluations.
After the shock in 1975, the budget deficit was reduced in 1976; from 21.5
percent of GDP to 14.2 percent. A further reduction was effected in 1979.
Both reductions were effected mainly through reducing domestic lending by
the government (inter alia to parastatal companies). Nevertheless, the
deficit remained high and had to be financed through domestic and foreign
borrowing. In 1976, almost 35 percent of total government expenditure was
financed by domestic borrowing. After 1979, foreign borrowing became the
main source of financing the budget deficit. Domestic borrowing caused a
crowding out effect on credits to the private sector. In 1974, the
government absorbed less than 20 percent of domestic credit, in 1980 this
figure had risen to almost 75 percent. Overall credit creation increased
from 22 percent of GDP in 1974 to 63 percent of GDP in 1980. The figures
indicate that the contractionary effect of reduced export earnings oii
consumption was partly compensated through domestic and foreign borrowing,
especially by the government. Thus, a situation of excess spending over
income was created.
One of the reasons behind this situation was the general trust in a
recovery of copper prices. Another reason may have been the relatively
easy access to foreign credit because of the existence of copper (and
cobalt) reserves in Zambia. On the expenditure side, high spending by the
government was enhanced by external factors such as bad weather conditions
in 1978 and 1979. Apart from its effect on the current account, the subse-
quent food imports forced the government into higher outlays for
subsidies, thus preventing a reduction in the budget deficit.22
Zambia concluded standby arrangements with the IMF in 1973. 1976 and 1978.
All three arrangements emphasised the need to reduce spending, especially
by the government. The government budget deficit and the subsequent
increase in the money supply was seen as the major problem facing the
country. Under the arrangement of 1976, producer prices for maize were
increased by 25 percent while subsidies on consumer prices, which had been
introduced since 1965, were reduced by 60 percent. To support these
measures, the programs prescribed devaluations of the Kwacha with the aim
at reducing import expenditures.
As already indicated above, the success of the programs in reducing
government consumption was limited. Nevertheless, the attempts to reduce
the budget deficit together with the lower copper export revenues had a
contractionary effect on the economy. In this period, real GDP growth can
only be observed in 1976 and 1980. Particularly investment expenditures
were hard hit by the contractionary effects of the bust period. Gross
fixed capital formation declined from 38 percent of GDP in 1975 to 18
percent in 1980, while the share of total consumption expenditure in GDP
remained constant and the difference between imports and exports of goods
and services declined. From these observstions, together with the relative
reduction of credit to the private sector it may be concluded that
government borrowing was mainly used to maintain consumption at a constant
level. Thus, the contractionary effect of the bust period was mainly on
investment expenditure. Apart from the different propensities to consume
of the government and the private sector, this may have been caused by the
lack of foreign exchange to finance investments or to obtain spare parts.
The latter caused underutilitsation of capacity in existing import
dependent industries and discouraged new investments.
As mentioned above, the expenditure reduction policy was supported by
exchange rate devaluations in 1976 and 1978. Both devaluations aimed at
discouraging imports and improving the profitability of the mining sector.
The latter would increase government revenue and reduce the deficit. The
devaluations were not specifically intended to encourage expansion in the
traded goods sector. This can be illustrated by the fact that both
devaluations were not even sufficient to compensate for the difference in23
inflation between Zambia and its trading partners, during the foregoing
decade. Despite the devaluations, government revenue from the mineral
sector became zero or negative between 19~~ and 1979. The effect on the
volume of imports cannot be measured because of the simultaneous effects
of other measures. The same holds true for the effect of devaluation oti
the price level. It is, however, striking that inflation in 19~6 nearly
doubled as compared to previous years. The total devaluation of about 26
percent between 19~5 and 198o was negated by an increase in the consumer
price index and an increase in wages of both more than 100 percent.
The period under review can be characterised by postponement of adjustment
through credit creation and foreign borrowing and by the continuation
of the symptoms of the Dutch Disease. Both expenditure reduction and
expenditure switching policies in this period were insufficient to
generate prospects for a recovery from the adverse effects in the economy
of falling mineral prices. The budget deficit had increased from 9 percent
of GDP in 19~9 to 18 percent in 1980 while the balance on current account
showed no improvement. Fxternal debt increased from 1.4 bin. dollars in
19~5 to more than 3.2 bin. dollars in 1980. Because of the middle level
income status of the country, only a small part of the loans were granted
under 'soft' conditions. The real appreciation of the exchange rate,
originating from the boom period and continued during the subsequent bust,
together with the relatively large extent of the non-traded goods sector,
including heavily protected industries, are typical for the Dutch Disease.
The postponement of adjustment measures is not only reflected in a conti-
nuation of current account deficits but also in a lack of incentives for
the traded goods sector. The sector suffered from the relatively high
domestic wage and price level while imports came in relatively cheap due
to the overvalued exchange rate. The devaluations of 19~6 and 1978 were
insufficient to change this situation. Apart from the other reasons men-
tioned above, the lack of prospects for the traded goods sector may ex-
plain the reduction in investment expenditure.
From this period it can be learned that an overall contraction of the
Zambian economy is likely to hit investment expenditure24
disproportionately, especially if the domestic cost level for the traded
goods sector is not improved. The fiscal linkage in a mineral exporting
developing country like Zambia plays a dominant role. The government
reaction to falling (mineral) revenues causes crowding-out effects while
the government also reduced its own lending activities. Apart from a lack
of resources to expand production, the traded goods sector lacks prospects
for competitive production, due to the symptoms of Dutch Disease. As
outlined in general terms in section two, this should be remedied by an
adequate expenditure switching policy together with credit ellocation to
prioríty sectors.
~ 3.3- Demand management and contraction; 1981-1985
In the beginning of the 1980s it became clear to the Zambian government
and its creditors that copper prices would not recover in the short term.
The conditions for external credits were sharpened. More severe
adjustments in the Zambian economy became unavoidable. In the IMF programs
in the period 1981 to 1985 again the emphasis was on reduction of
spending. The burden of expenditure reduction was laid on the government
which was seen as the major source of excess spending over income.
The economic policy in this period is characterised by the more outspoken
objective of reducing expenditure in order to reduce drastically the
current account deficit and make funds available for debt payment
obligations.
In this period, three arrangements with the IMF were concluded, two of
which were canceled prematurely. The first program started in 1981 and
was scheduled to run until 1983. It included an overall credit ceiling and
arrangements to reduce the budget deficit through a reduction of
subsidies. The program was broken off in July 1982 because Zambia did not
meet the program targets for reduction of payment arrears and for limiting
credit supply. Copper prices had declined after the recovery in 1979 and
1980. The losses of the mining sector were financed through the domestic
banking system which led to excess credit supply. In addition, poor rains25
during the planting season and the subsequent food imports in 1982 implied
a further deterioration of the current account balance.
After the government had introduced some modifications in the agricultural
policy and the Kwacha had been devalued by 20 percent in the beginning of
~983, a new arrangement with the IMF was concluded in April 1983. Apart
from restrictions in credit expansion the arrangement included a more
flexible exchange rate policy. The program was scheduled until March 1984,
but part of the IMF credit remained undrawn because Zambia did not meet
the criteria for reduction of payment arrears.
In May ~984 a new arrangement was concluded with the same objectives as
the previous ones. In addition it included measures to increase agricul-
tural producer prices. Furthermore, exporting companies could henceforth
retain 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings. Although debt
repayment and reduction of arrears did not meet IMF criteria, the
agreement was not canceled. Instead, the Zambian government agreed to
start auctioning of foreign exchange in October 1985. This decision
probably prevented a premature breakdown of the '84 program which was due
to run to January ~986.
The limited success of IMF programs in this period calls for a closer
examination of economic developments. The emphasis in these programs was
on expenditure reduction policy, supported by devaluations from 1983 on.
The first question to be answered is whether these policies were indeed
implemented. In a second phase the outcome should be related to the
implementation.
Efforts to reduce the budget deficit in this period were highly influenced
by external factors such as weather conditions and copper prices. A reduc-
tion in the budget deficit can indeed be observed in 1981 and 1983, but a
disappointing agricultural season forced the government into high spen-
dings on subsidies in 1982. This raises the questíon whether adjustment
programs should make provisions for this kind of external influence. The
impact of external circumstances on economic development stresses the need
to overcome dependence on copper exports and to develop agricultural acti-
vities. The scope for any macro-economic adjustment program seems limited26
as long as it can only be implemented in 'normal' years. Especially be-
cause normal years turn out to be a rare event in Zambia.
It thus becomes hardly possible to relate reductions in the government
budget deficit to improvements in the current account deficit. In 1981
f.i. the budget deficit was decreased from 18.5 percent of GDP to 12.9
percent. However, in the same year the current account deficit increased
because of a decline in copper prices. In 1983 and '84, when the budget
deficit stabilised around 8 percent of GDP, the current account deficit
was indeed reduced. The reduction in the budget deficit was effected
through minimising the lending activities of the government and through
reducing capital outlays. The distribution of credit among the government
and the private sector remained stable, whereby the private sector
obtained around 30 percent of total credit until 1984. But the effects on
investment were again disappointing. Gross fixed capital formation
decreased from a share in GDP of about 18 percent in 1980 to 10 percent in
1985. In 1984 and 1985, consumption of fixed capital even exceeded gross
fixed capital formation. Thus, the possíbilities for any structural
recovery were actually non-existent.
The decrease in investment expenditure finds its causes in both supply and
demand constraints. The continuous slide in export earnings and the at-
tempts by the government to pursue an expenditure reduction policy led to
demand contraction and overcapacity. On the supply side, the reduction in
imports ( the import volume was reduced by two thirds between 1980 and
1985) led to shortages of spare parts and intermediate goods.
These considerations pertain to both the traded and the non-traded goods
sector. The development of the non-traded goods sector depends critically
on domestic demand. In a situation of demand contraction, the traded goods
sector may shift its emphasis to external demand, provided it is competi-
tive on world markets. As mentioned above, the competitiveness of the
Zambian traded goods sector was inter alia hampered by an overvalued
exchange rate. Between 1979 and 1982, the exchange rate was fixed to the
SDR, resulting in a real appreciation of more than 11 percent in these
years. More as a means to discourage imports than as a measure toencourage production of traded goods, the exchange rate was devalued in
1983 by 20 percent. After this devaluation it was allowed to depreciate
further. The depreciation more than outweighted inflation in this period,
what is reflected in a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate of
more than 26 percent from 1983 to 1985 while the nominal effective
exchange rate depreciation amounted to more than 42 percent. The supply
responses to this devaluation will be outlined in the next paragraph where
devaluation is the dominant subject. It should be noted, however, that the
exchange rate was highly overvalued in 1983 partly because of differences
ín inflation rates between Zambia and its trading partners in foregoing
years. The devaluations in the period 1983 to 1985 probably have been
sufficient to compensate for this difference. A comparison of the MUV
index and the Zambian Consumer Price Index adjusted for depreciations,
shows that, starting in 1964 as a base year, the divergence between these
two is removed in 1984. The divergence in price levels originated from the
spending effect in the late 1960s. The depreciation of 1983-85 thus
implies that the competitive position of Zambia in 1984 was about the same
as in the beginning of the 1960s. This means however that compensation
still would have to be found for differences in (developments in}
productivity and, especially for exports, for the high transport costs
from Zambia. Thus, the exchange rate remained overvalued. Nevertheless,
the traded goods sector, and especially the import competing part of it,
undoubtedly benefitted from the devaluations, except where its import
content was very high.
In general it can be concluded that the current account deficit was indeed
steadily reduced after 1981. The most important factor in this respect
seems to be the lack of foreign exchange, including capital imports.
Reductions in the budget deficit were ambiguous and only partly
contributed to the reduction of the current account deficit. A further
crowding-out effect of credits to the government was halted in this
period. Nonetheless, the investment rate decreased further. Together with
the loss in export earnings this led to negative growth rates in 1982, '83
and '84. Differences with the earlier period were essentially based on
reduced availability of foreign finance. This forced the government to
reduce its budget deficit and to restrict imports. Imports were further28
discouraged by the devaluations from 1983 onward. Thus, on a macro-
economic level, prospects for economic recovery were actually diminishing.
Investment expenditure declined while the economy contracted.
On a sectoral level, the contraction mainly took effect through reduced
output in the manufacturing sector, followed by commerce and community,
social and personal services. The agricultural sector, however, shows a
remarkable recovery in the years following the drought in 1982. Copper
production decreased from more than 600,000 tons in 1980 to almost 480,000
tons in 1985.
The agricultural sector benefitted from some modifications in agricultural
policy, introduced by the government in 1982. A higher priority, at least
on paper, was given to traditional farming while plans for large scale
state farms were abandoned. Znstead, incentives were given to large scale
commercial farmers to turn to more export oriented production. Producer
prices were increased and the marketing system was liberalised. After the
drought in 1982, agricultural output increased by 8.6 percent in 1983. 5.6
percent in 1984 and 9.3 percent in 1985. In 1985, the country reached
self sufficiency in maize. The government effectively reduced
subsidies to the agricultural sector on inputs such as transport and
fertilizer in 1983 and 1984. This contributed significantly to a reduction
of the budget deficit in these years. The burden of de-subsidisation was
primarily borne by consumers.l~~
Here the effects of expenditure reduction policy become more apparent.
Adjustment to price distortions in agriculture was combined with efforts
to reduce the budget deficit. The general decontrol of prices, which was
effected by the end of 1982, must have been beneficial to the
manufacturing sector as well. Output in this sector, however, did not
respond. Actually, manufacturing output in 1983 and 1984 was below the
1982 figure. Obviously, the sector suffered more from demand contraction
and shortage of foreign exchange than the agricultural sector. The
government tried to encourage exports from the agricultural and
manufacturing sectors by introducing a 50x retention scheme for non-
traditional exporters. The scheme enabled exporters to meet their import
requirements and was indeed regarded as a major incentive.29
The devaluations from 1983 on mainly aimed to improve the viability of the
mining sector. The losses of the sector in previous years were indeed
reversed but a substantial contribution to government revenue cannot be
observed in 1983 and 1984. In 1983, Zambia obtained external finance of US
S 300 min. for a rehabilitation program of the mines. This was seen as a
first step in the recovery process after which resources could be diverted
to other industries. But in the light of the foregoing analysis it is
rather to be considered as a closure of the vicious circle in which Zambia
got caught. Diversification was hampered by a lack of financial resources.
To generate these resources, finance could, however, only be secured for
the mines, what made the country even more dependent on its mineral
resource.
The expenditure reduction policy, in this period, although implemented
only partially in terms of the budget deficit and credit supply, succeeded
in reducing the current account deficit. The reductions were, however,
insufficient to allow for debt repayment obligations. The policy also
succeeded in limiting inflation while prices were decontroled and the
Kwacha was devaluated. Decontrol of prices by the end of 1982 led to a
relatively moderate increase in inflation from 12.5 percent in 1982 to
17.8 percent in 1983. On the other hand, the policy contributed to a
contraction in the economy. Investment expenditure decreased and GDP
actuslly declined. Part of the burden of the expenditure reduction policy
was passed on to the consumers, who saw their real income decline, while
unemployment increased. In short, the period lacked any prospects for a
recovery of the economy. Under persistantly falling mineral revenues the
country would be forced to reduce its expenditures continuously. A further
recovery of the agricultural sector would be hampered by decressing
domestic demand, lack of imported inputs and an overvalued exchange rate.
Despite the reductions in imports, the policy Failed to generate resources
to service debt repayment obligations.
Because of this unsatisfactory outcome of adjustment policies until 1985,
the government decided to a major policy change by the end of 1985. The
measures implied a further liberalisation of the economy including
abolishment of import licences and quantitative restricitons, decontrol ofinterest rates and abolishment of price subsidies. The major action to be
taken was the introduction of a weekly foreign exchange auction, starting
in October 1985.
~ 3.4. Foreign exchange auctions and switching; 1985-1987
The period under review coincides with the foreign exchange auction from
October 1985 until April 198~. In May 198~ the government decided to break
with the current IMF program. It mentioned the deterioration of living
standards and the mounting debt payment obligations as the main reasons
behind this move. Inflation had, according to official statistics,
increased from 3~ percent in 1985 to 52 percent in 1986. The value of the
Kwacha declined from K 2,2 per USS before the auction to K 21 in April
198~.
The emphasis of economic policy in this period was clearly on expenditure
switching with the objectives to reduce imports, to improve the
profitability of the mining sector and to boost exports. Expenditure
reduction policy íncluded further efforts to reduce the budget deficit
through cuts in the subsidy bill and an increase in interest rates.
However, the expenditure reduction policy failed to keep inflation under
control while expenditure switching did not bring the desired expansion in
the traded goods sector. Both observations indicate that the areas of
conflict as outlined in paragraph two above, played a dominant role in
this period. As mentioned there, these conflicts are strongly related to
the environment in which the adjustment process takes place, being a
mineral exporting developing country.
Apart from a purely economic analysis, the failure of the adjustment pro-
gram in this period can also be approached from the political side. One
might argue that the IMF has not adequately analysed the political
viability of the program. The beneficiaries of it were not the political
most powerful groups. i8~ The riots at the end of 1986, which followed the
removal of maize meal subsidies but which were essentially an expression
of general discontent with the deterioration of living standards,31
contributed to the breaking down of the program. Furthermore, the slow
release of resources from donor countries and suspension of releases by
the IMF had a severe negative impact on the program. The Zambian
government could be blamed because it failed to control public
expenditure, although this issue is related to the general performance of
the program. Apart from that, the public was not very well informed about
the economic and social consequences and prospects of the program.
Finally, the turbulence of changes in the economy put too much pressure on
the managerial capacity of the political and business leadership. All
these factors, some of which are strongly related to economic performance,
have contributed to the failure of the program and therefore add to the
explanation From the economic side as presented in this section.
The implementation of the program was the subject of continuous disputes
between Zambia and the IMF. As far as devaluations are concerned, it can-
not be denied that the auction system led to a huge fall in the value of
the Kwacha whereby the currency was even becoming undervalued by the end
of 1986.~9~ The disputes focussed on the regulations for the auction
system, making the IMF and donor countries to withdraw their support for
the system in the second half of 1986. The international donor community
argued that the interventions of the Bank of Zambia in the suction system
actually stimulated hígher Kwacha bids for dollars. The implementation of
expenditure reduction policy is more difficult to analyse because it is
related to the devaluation, the debt repayment obligations and the
increase in interest rates. Interest rates were raised from 14.5 percent
in 1984 to 25 percent in 1985, increasing dramatically the claims of the
domestic banking system on the government. Through the devaluations, the
government foreign debt in Kwacha terms also increased making it even more
difficult to reduce the budget deficit. This is one of the major areas of
conflict of the two policies. The same holds true for the efforts to
reduce the subsidy bill while, through the devaluation, the costs of
agricultural products were on the increase because of rising costs of
transport and fertiliser.20~ On the other hand, the government budgets in
this period are an indication of major efforts to reduce current
expenditure. In 1986, civil service staffing was to be reduced from 80.000
to 60.000 while charges for medical services and boarding fees for schools32
were introduced. Discussions with the IMF during this period focussed on
the reduction of subsidies, the regulations for the foreign exchange
auction and the rescheduling of payment arrears to the Fund. The
implementation did not fully meet IMF criteria.
Supply constraints
With the emphasis on expenditure switching, the major objective of
economic policy in this period was to expand production in the traded
goods sector and to reduce imports. As observed in earlier
sections, the volume of imports had already declined by about thirty
percent in the period 1975 to 1980. while the reduction accelerated in the
next five years with a decline of more than 65 percent. Thus, imports
tended to become increasingly inelastic to price increases. The volume of
copper exports had been declining since 1976, due to supply and transport
constraints, while the mines necessarily shifted to lower grade ores. In
general, mining activities tend to react very slowly to price incentives.
Thus, the major response was to be expected from the other, non-mining,
traded goods sector.
The domestic market for traded goods was actually contracting, except for
some import-substitutes which could no longer be imported because of the
shortage of foreign exchange. The devaluation should improve the compati-
tiveness of the traded goods sector whereby excess capacity in the import
substitution sector could be used for exports and export oriented activi-
ties could be expanded. Such a supply response, however, cannot be obser-
ved in Zambia. The reasons for this are closely related to the nature of
the mineral dependent economy and the simultaneous efforts to reduce spen-
ding under falling mineral export receipts.
First it should be noted that the import substitution industry was mainly
concentrated in two branches: final consumer goods (with a large import
component) and inputs for the mines. This structure originated from the
boom period as mentioned before. Both industries were hit by the fall in
mineral revenues snd the subsequent decline in aggregate demand. The in-33
puts for the mines were ín most cases too specific to be suitable for ex-
ports. A limited outlet for these products could only be found in the
Zaïrean copper mines. The scope for exports of final consumer goods is
also limited because of the large import component and because many of
them were not yet up to the international standards. Moreover, these
industries have got used to producing behing tariff barriers. Thus the
prospects for a large part of the import substitution industry to expand
production for exports were restricted.
The expansion of already existing export activities looked more promising.
The output of the non-traditional export sector consisted largely of
agricultural products in which Zambia has a comparative advantage due to a
mild climate and ample reserves of cultivable land. The sector is,
however, very small. In 1987, it still accounted for only six percent of
total export earnings. Even if high growth rates were realised here, the
non-traditional export sector would not be in a position to make up for
the shortfall in export receipts in the short run. Nevertheless, the non-
traditional export sector would have been one of the major beneficiaries
from the expenditure switching policy.
An important factor determining the prospects of expansion of non-
traditional exports is the transport situation of landlocked Zambia.
According to IMF statistics, Zambia has one of the highest cif~fob factors
in the world. To be competitive on world markets, Zambia has to overcome
its transport disadvantage through very low production costs. The high
grade copper ores provided Zambia with a comparative advantage. The
comparative advantage in other fields is likely to be less explicit. In
order to lower production costs, Zambia will be forced to further reduce
its real wage level in terms of traded goods prices. A limited outlet for
exports may be found on the regional market. But many countries in the
region produce similar goods for exports while South Africa and Zimbabwe
both have more productive economies.
It should be further noted that in Zambia about 70 percent of
manufacturing output originates from parastatal companies. These companies
may need other incentives than changes in outputprices to expand34
production. Moreover, many companies have a monopoly position and do not
respond quickly to pressure to boost output.
Another restriction for the targeted increase in traded goods production
is provided by the lack of foreign exchange. Excess capacity not only
resulted from demand contraction but also from a shortage of imported
inputs. The retention scheme helped to overcome this problem, but many
companies were still locked in this vicious circle. It would help to
introduce an export credit scheme for these companies. The Zambian
government has, at various occasions, promised to set up such system, but
it never came into being. Companies were still reported to receive export
orders which they could not accept due to a lack of foreign exchange.
Despite the objective to boost exports in this period, no provisions were
made in the program to supply exporting companies with foreign exchange
credits.
Expansion of traded goods production for the internal market is not very
promising, due to the contraction in the economy. On the other hand, MEDCs
tend to be large food importers while neglecting their agricultural
sector.21~ Zambia is no exception to the rule. with a low agricultural
growth rate until 1982 and a high share of food imports in total imports.
The food selfsufficiency ratio has actually declined between 1964 and
1980. 19~6 was the last year of net maize exports. Self sufficiency in
maize was reached again in 1985. But the food situation remained
wlnerable, expressed in the need for maize imports in 1986. Wheat self-
sufficiency does not exceed the 15 percent level. Agricultural expansion
can be regarded as the major area to develop. The sector is, however,
highly regulated by the government. A devaluation would lead to higher
prices for imputs like transport and fertilizer which are subsidised by
the government. If the budget is to be reduced, these costs should be
transferred to the producer. Agricultural producers, in turn, should be
allowed to increase output prices to import~export parity. Devaluation
would thus provide a major incentive to increase agricultural production.
But it would put the burden of adjustment unilaterally on the consumer
when prices of basic food are allowed to increase. Any adjustment program35
should therefore include measures in the field of wage policy or a safety
net to protect the poorest groups.
In 1985 and 1986, producer prices were increased, mainly to allow for
higher costs of imported inputs. Consumer prices, however, remained
constant, forcing the government into even higher spending on subsidies.
This way the devaluation worked against the policy to reduce subsidies.
A way out of this dilemma should be provided for in an adequate adjustment
program, which was not the case in the arrangements between Zambia and the
IMF for 1986. The IMF seems to have given priority to the deflationary
effect of e reduction of subsidies because this would diminish the budget
deficit. This, in turn, could have a positive effect for the consumers,
particularly the poorest ones, who usually suffer the most from rapid
inflation. But this is a very indirect and uncertain mechanism to protect
poor consumers. They should be protected for a drastic deterioration in
living standards by more direct measures.
The factors mentioned above all add to the general conclusion that a short
term supply response could not be expected from the devaluations. Supply
constraints, related to the mineral dependent structure of the economy,
prevented this. The development of wages and prices formed another obstac-
le for a rapid supply response.
Wages and prices
It is recalled that wages were allowed to rise by more than 10 percent a
year in the boom period, mainly because mineworkers unions were able to
secure high wage increases. The increases spread over to the rest of the
economy, leaving Zambia with a relatively high wage level by regional
standards. This development is not uncommon for MEDCs.22~ But it
diminishes the prospects for development of other traded goods activities.
In other words, the change over to traded goods production required a more
severe deterioration in real wages as compared to countries with a
relatively lower wage level. Between 19~8 and 1984, wages in non-
agricultural activities increased by 55 percent while the low income
consumer price index increased by 126 percent. The deterioration was
accelerated by the higher inflation rates in 1985 and '86. In 1985, the36
real purchasing power of incomes was already below the 196~ level. The
deterioration in the real wage rate seems inevitable for an improvement of
the competitiveness of the traded goods sector. But is should lead to an
increase in employment opportunities to make it socially acceptable. Given
the supply constraints outlined above, this could not be expected in te
short term. Moreover, a lower real wage rate is likely to result in lower
demand for small scale industry goods and services. This, in turn, has a
negative impact on employment.~3~ Thus the real wage reduction in 1985 and
'86 only led to spending contraction and a deterioration in living
standards without any compensating effect in the economy.
Probably the only positive impact has been a reduction in demand for
imports and a subsequent improvement in the current account balance. This
implies that the foreign creditors were the only beneficiaries of the
deterioration of living standards in Zambia. The liberalisation measures
starting with the foreign exchange auction should have
included compensation measures or at least a safety net for the social
groups most serverely hit by the deterioration in living standards.
Especially as a recovery in employment can only be expected in the medium
term.
On the other hand, the huge decline in real wages might still have been
insufficient to restore the competitiveness of the traded goods sector.
Given the relatively high initial wage level, a further deterioration may
be needed. Especially because other traded goods activities will inevit-
ably have a much lower comparative advantage as copper exports. But even
if competitiveness of Zambian traded goods is fully restored, the supply
response of the sector will be limited due to the factors mentioned above.
It is not only the real wage level, but also the developments in the price
level which determine the prospects for the traded goods sector under an
expenditure switching policy. In case prices are allowed to increase
accordingly, the effect of devaluation is negated. According to official
statistics, this happened only partly in Zambía. Inflation rates in 1985
and '86 amounted to 35 anà 56 percent respectively. Based on these
figures, the real effective exchange rate depreciated by 7.5 and 51.8
percent in '85 and '86 while the nominal effective exchange rate37
depreciated by 20 and 65.9 percent. So devaluations were not fully
nullified by domestic price increases.
Areas of conflict
As mentioned before, expenditure reduction policy could not fully be
implemented during this period. The government was unable to reduce its
expenditure, partly because the devaluation and the increase in interest
rates forced the government into higher spendings to service its domestic
and foreign creditors. Moreover, the existing subsidy structure led to
increasing expenditures under expenditure switching policy. The subsequent
growth in the money supply added to the inflationary effect of the
devaluation. Thus, instead of supporting the expenditure switching policy
by controlling its price effects, the expenditure reduction policy
actually stirred up further price increases. It is, however, doubtful
whether it would be possible to actually reduce government expenditure
under these circumstances. The conflicting areas dominated the mutually
supporting areas. A consistent approach was needed which would take into
account these conflicting areas. The ongoing depreciations in the second
half of 1986, coming after a period of stabilisation, can partly be
explained by the increase in inflation rates. Thus an inflation-
devaluation spiral occurred with a harmful impact on the adjustment
process. Downward pressure on the value of the Kwacha was further caused
by the modifications in the suction system introduced by the Bank of
Zambia. The modifications led to uncertainty about the future availability
of foreign exchange. Moreover, the modifications provoked the withdrawal
of foreign support for the system leading to reduced supply of foreign
exchange on the auction floor.
The lack of consistency between fiscal~monetary and exchange rate measures
may have been caused by the absence of an integrated program. The discus-
sions with the IMF inainly served to secure external support and were domi-
nated by regulations for the auction system and the determinatíon of other
policy variables. The discussions, however, did not result in a program in
which policy measures were integrated and which included compensation
measures to protect the most vulnerable groups. Moreover, a clear outline38
of the targets of economic policy in the medium term was missing. The
foreign exchange auctions can be considered as an experiment, the outcome
of which should determine future programs for the Zambian economy.
The first lesson to be learnt is that a rapid supply response cannot be
expected from expenditure switching in this environment. Increased supply
of traded goods in the short term can only be expected from increased
capacity utilisation in some industries.
In the second place, expenditure reduction policy should be brought in
line with the expenditure switching policy. In practice, this means that
compensation has to be found for increased government expenditure caused
by the devaluations. If the foreign creditors stick to their demands for
debt repayment, the budget deficit is likely to increase. Therefore, a
ceiling in debt repayment obligations should be negotiated which allows
the government to adjust the exchange rate without immediate pressure on
the budget from the foreign debt. Debt repayment obligations could be
increased once the reform program starts to yield results. On the revenue
side, the government should maximize its income from the mining sector.
The windfall gains of this sector, caused by the devaluation, should be
taxed by the government. Increased government revenue can thus be used to
compensate certain wlnerable groups in society that suffer most from the
inevitable inflation. Part of the revenues, however, should be used to
support that part of the traded goods sector which has a comparative
advantage. In Zambia, this seems to be first of all the agricultural
sector that can increase the production of both import substitutes and
exportables.
Furthermore, the access of the traded goods sector to foreign exchange
should be improved. The sector's need for foreign exchange likely
increases initially because of efforts to increase production. Foreign
support to set up an export credit scheme may be considered.
The allocation of foreign exchange should become subject to more strict
government control as compared to the suction system. Under the auction
system, the government was not able to effectively control imports of
luxuries. Moreover, foreign exchange was not necessarily allocated to39
priority sectors in the economy. Of the total amount of dollars disbursed
during the first year of the suction, the agricultural sector obtained
onl 6
24~
y percent. The allocation of foreign exchange, therefore, cannot
be fully left to market forces. During the restructuring process,
government control over the allocation of foreign exchange seems desirable
although it will be difficult to fully avoid privileged allocation and
paralel markets. Government control should not prevent the exchange rate
from moving to a more realistic level. Identification of the exchange rate
which is considered to reflect the real value of the currency should
preceed decisions about devaluation. Any idea of what the real exchange
rate should be was lacking during the auction system. Furthermore,
increased government control over foreign exchange allocations should go
along with a clear and detailed identification of priority sectors and
industries.
This identification implies that choices have to be made in advance about
the development of industrial activities. The tariff structure and the
relatively high wage level have been in favor of capital intensive produc-
tion in the past. This kind of production, however, is vulnerable to
changes in the availability oF foreign exchange. Moreover, it cannot con-
tribute substantially to the creation of employment. Employment creation
becomes increasingly important in Zambia, where almost 50 percent of the
population is living in towns, while only a fraction is employed in the
formal sector. The contraction in the economy in the 1980s has emphasized
the need for new employment opportunities. Adjustment programs tend to
lead to additional unemployment due to contraction of the non-traded goods
sector including the government. These considerations should lead to a
reconsideration of the development strategy.
The same way of reasoning can be applied to the agricultural sector.
Initially the government encouraged large scale production and the
introduction of state farms. This had led to a neglect of small scale
farming while self-sufficiency in food production was not reached. The
strategy was partially reversed in the beginning of the 1980s. It should
be noted, however, that devaluations without further policy measures on a
sectoral level may shift agricultural development into an undesired40
direction. Small scale farmers may be unproportionally affected by an
increase in transport costs. They may also not be able to raise funds to
finance increased fertiliser costs, especially when interest rates are
also raised. In general, access to credits is easier for large scale
industries as compared to small scale ones. The volume and access may even
be more important variables than the interest rate. Credits to small scale
industries are assumed to involve higher supervision costs while large
scale industries, in general, will have closer contacts with bank
managers. Credit constraint and devaluation should therefore include
measures on a sectoral level to ensure that macro-economic policy is in
line with priorities in subsectors.
The choice for small scale and labor intensive production may initially
imply a slower pace of output growth as could be expected from large scale
projects. It implies that Zambia has to resist pressure from creditors for
a short term debt repayment scheme. This can only be defended if the de-
velopment strategy is based on a well designed and detailed program of how
the adjustment process will be carried out. From the creditors some pa-
tience should be demanded for the sake of a more sustainable and less
dependent development of Zambia. Adjustment programs so far have given too
much emphasis on the need to fullfil debt repayment obligations in the
short run. This way, Zambia had to adjust to too many external changes at
once. The postponement of adjustment in the late 1970s led to the need to
adjust to both falling terms of trade and increasing debt repayment obli-
gations in the 1980s. The failure to meet these obligations led to the
breakdown of several programs, thus hampering further adjustment efforts.
~ 3.5. Recent developments; 198~ to present
The period after the break with the IMF-inspired policy in May 198~ can
neither be characterised by expenditure switching policy nor by
expenditure reduction policy. The exchange rate was again fixed to the US
dollar at a rate of K8 - S1. It was not until November 1988 that the
exchange rate was devaluated to K10 per dollar. With official inflation41
running at 43 and 60 percent respectively in 1987 and '88, this clearly
implied a real appreciation.
The period shows some similarities with the post-independence decade. The
Zambian go-it-alone strategy coincided with a rising trend in copper pric-
es. The exchange rate was not adjusted for inflation differences and be-
came increasingly overvalued. This, in turn, prevented further diversifi-
cation in the economy. Structural adjustment was again postponed. The
present policy neglects the internal need to restructure the economy. The
inevitable adjustment process will thus become more difficult to
accomplish.
With regard to the budget deficit, the break with the IMF brought some
relief. The government decided to impose a ten percent ceiling on debt
servícing through which the provisions in the budget could be reduced by
25 percent. Combined with other measures this implied a decrease in the
budget deficit from 14 percent of GDP in 1987 to 9.5 percent in 1988.
However, due to reduced donor support in these years, - obviously related
to the break with the IMF - the larger part of the deficit had to be
financed from domestic sources. This again led to unbalanced growth in the
money supply and fueled inflation.
Following the decision of the Zambian government to break with the current
program, the IMF and the World Bank withdrew their support and in their
foodsteps the international donor community drastically reduced
development aid. Most donor countries concentrated their criticism on the
formal break of Zambia with the IMF program. This way, the Zambian
government is held responsible for the failure of economic policy after
1985. But, as shown above, the IMF-inspired program contained some
inconsistent measures, implying that it is not only the Zambian government
who is to blame. This calls for a more critical approach of donor
countries towards economic policy in Zambia. Decisions about donor support
should be based on economic policy in Zambia, not on the formal step to
break with the program. The fact that the outcome of the adjustment policy
after 1985 did not fully come up to expectations calls for a review of
economic policy recommendations, not for a withdrawal based on formal
steps.4z
On the positive side it should be noted that the break with the IMF at
least brought some stabilisation in the economy. The uncertainty under the
auction system had made it very difficult to carry out any planning exer-
cises for the economy. Furthermore, social unrest could hardly be
controlled in that period. It should also be noted that the attempts by
the government to reduce dependence on imports were reinforced after the
auction. Companies were encouraged or even forced to look for local
resources for their production process.
But the deterioration in living standards, which was the main reason for
the break with the IMF, was not halted after May 198~. The scarcity of
foreign exchange due to reduced foreign credits and donor support and the
growth in the money supply are the main causes of spiraling inflation. The
period also shows the revival of paralel markets for essential goods. It
is striking that during the last two years, even in official statistics,
increases in the consumer price index for low income groups, exceed the
index for high income groups. The higher incomes, with a larger share of
imports in their consumption basket, benefitted from the revaluation of
the Kwacha in May '8~.
The act of breaking with the IMF-inspired policy was more convincing than
the Zambian substitute for these measures. The break may even have
inspired the IMF to reconsider its adjustment policies. In the meantime,
the IMF has created some facilities like the SAF and ESAF which may be
more suitable for countries like Zambia. The failure of adjustment efforts
before 198~ cannot only be blamed on Zambia, as was shown in the previous
paragraphs.
Zambia may find itself under increased pressure to conclude a new
arrangement with the IMF. Internally, the need for adjustment has not
decreased. External relations deteriorate because of the imposed ceiling
on debt servicing. This situation cannot be sustained for long. Payment
arrears increase rapidly while the prolongation of internal imbalances
will make it more difficult to carry out reforms in the future. So far
Zambia has been able to postpone this inevitable step towards adjustment
thanks to increased copper prices and a good agricultural season in 1988.43
But the need for donor support has Zambia already brought back to
negotiations with the IMF.
~ 4. Conclusions
In this paper the basic elements of structural adjustment have been relat-
ed to the properties of the consumption and production structure of
MEDCs. The balance between expenditure reduction policy and expenditure
switching policy determines the outcome of the adjustment process. The
timing and the adoption of policy measures influences the balance. Too
much emphasis on fiscal~monetary policy, i.e. expenditure reduction, leads
to an improvement in the current account balance while growth perspectives
are actually decreasing and unemployment rates rise. Diversification,
which should be one of the main objectives of structural adjustment in
mineral dependent economies, will not be effected because of a lack of
resources and prospects. This was what happened in Zambia in the first
half of the 1980s. The current account dificit and the budget deficit
decreased but GDP growth and investment expenditure became negative. Under
falling terms of trade, no perspectives were created for a substantial
recovery of non-mineral sectors.
Too much emphasis on expendíture switching policy, on the other hand, will
lead to diversification in the medium term. But it needs to be supported
by adequate fiscal~monetary policy to control inflation. Devaluation, by
definition, results in a rise in the price of traded goods and there is
not much expenditure reduction policy can do about this. The broad
instrument of overall expenditure contraction will be insufficient. The
other, indirect, inflationary impact is chanelled through the government
budget. Government expenditure is likely to rise because of increased
expenditure on subsidies and because debt servicing increases in domestic
currency terms. Expenditure reduction policy should focus on this indirect
effect of devaluation. These aspects of devaluation should be provided for
before the devaluations take off. In Zambis, the government budget could
not be controlled during the auctions because no measures were implemented44
to counteract increased expenditures. Economic policy in this period,
therefore, became based on ad hoc measures.
The objective of structural adjustment programs in MEDCs should be a
diversification of the economy through expansion of traded goods
production. Devaluation provides the incentive for the traded goods sector
only if prices for non-traded goods remain relatively constant. This
depends on the design of expenditure reduction policy. But even then, as
became clear from the Zambian experience, the traded goods sector cannot
be expected to respond in the short run. The supply response is closely
related to the mineral dependent structure of the economy. The switching
policy requires flexibility in the economy. Domestic rigidities and lack
of mobility of productive factors may prevent expansion of the output of
traded goods.
First, there is the issue of real wages. From a macro-economic point of
view, real wages should behave in the same way as prices of non-traded
goods i.e. real wages should decline in terms of traded goods prices.
MEDCs tend to have a relatively high wage level. This means that wage
earners will be confronted with a severe decline in their real income,
particularly when the devaluation goes along with reforms in the budget
deficit resulting in a decrease of consumer subsidies. The decline in real
wages may become unsustainable, calling for additional measures to protect
the most wlnerable groups in society. In the medium term, new employment
opportunities may compensate for the deterioration in living standards.
A supply response of the existing import-substitution sector is hampered
by the contraction in domestic demand. The structure of the sector does
not make it very suitable for exports either. It has mainly concentrated
its activities on production of final consumer goods and inputs for the
mines. The positive exception will be the agricultural sector, which may
respond quickly to incentives and which will be able to export once it has
supplied the domestic market.
The scope for exports is further limited because, for a long time, only
the mining sector was involved in this branche. Consequently, experience45
with export markets is very limited, especially in the field of marketing.
If exports other than minerals still account for only a small part of
total exports, as in the case of Zambia, the sector cannot be expected to
compensate substantially in the short term for the fall in export revenues
from minerals. On the other hand, the small size of the non-traditional
export sector should make it easier to support expansion of this sector
with subsidies or other incentives. Such support would not draw too
heavily on the government budget deficit.
A supply response of non-mining sectors is further restricted by the con-
tinuous pressure to weight support for the mineral sector against support
for other sectors. It can be argued that increasing the viability of the
mining sector through new investments will, eventually, also lead to
increased government income. The Zambian government has not been able to
resist these arguments from the mining sector, thus diverting resources
away from other sectors. But also donor countries have found it more easy
to support the mines instead of identifying other areas eligible for
support. The donor community may be motivated by the need to secure a
constant flow of copper to its industries. But the Zambian government
should ask itself if the míning sector is still the most viable sector for
investment. Internally, such considerations will, however, be influenced
by the strong political power of the mining sector.
Specific for the Zambian case is its transport problem which severely
restricts its possibilities to expand export production. Less specific may
be the government intervention in the production structure through
parastatal companies. If these companies are less sensitive to price
incentives, devaluation will not necessarily have the desired effect on
production in these companies.
The low elasticity of supply in the traded goods sector adds to the con-
clusion that, even under a balanced expenditure reduction and expenditure
switching policy, structural adjustment will be a time consuming process.
In Zambia, this process was postponed until the beginning of the 1980s. By
that time, the country not only had to adjust to falling terms of trade
but also to increased debt service obligations. The adjustment policies46
from 1983 onward had the objective to boost traded goods production and
debt servicing.
In an economy which is highly dependent on mineral exports and where the
terms of trade continue to decline, diversification should, in the short
term, be given priority over the obligation to service the foreign debt.
Diversification of the economy will not be effected if too much emphasis
is put on a short term reversal of current account deficits and on debt
servicing.
In Zambia, the IMF stressed the need to meet payment arrears in the
beginning of the 1980s. It can be argued that this not only led to the
breakdown of several programs but also to the postponement of adjustment
in terms of diversification. The need to reduce expenditure in the short
term implied a neglect of the need to diversify the economy.
It can also be argued that a relaxation of debt repayment obligations will
give countries like Zambia the time to identify the most appropriate
development strategy. In Zambia, priority should be given to small scale
farming and labor intensive industries. Although this strategy will take a
longer time period to yield results, it may, in the end, prove more
sustainable than a strategy based on quick yielding projects.
Given the supply constaints in the economy, a diversification strategy
will inevitably be a medium term strategy. In the meantime, provisions
should be made to manage the foreign debt. In the case of Zambia, this
means that the country needs the time and the money to carry out an
adjustment program based on an expenditure switching policy. Zambia only
had this time and the money in the years just after the copper boom. It
then should have handled the symptoms of the Dutch Disease. But the
government failed to take appropriate measures to effectively encourage
diversification of the economy in this period. With hintsight it can be
argued that some painful decisions taken by that time would have prevented
the hardships of going through adjustment in a later stage when the debt
burden has increased and the terms of trade have declined even further. In
the 1980s, adjustment mainly concentrated on expenditure reduction under
pressure of international creditors. By the time switching policy became47
the major device, the debt burden had increased dramatically. Moreover,
the shock therapy based on foreign exchange auctions could only work in a
flexible economy which is able to respond in the short run to price
incentives.
It is striking that, after the break of Zambia with the IMF-program in
1987, the Fund has introduced new facilities which may also be more
suitable for the Zambian situation. The SAF and ESAF facilities,
established in March ~986 and December 1987 respectively, enlarged the
availability of conditional finance to low-income developing countries.
The facilities aim to support medium term structural adjustment with the
assistance of both the World Bank and the IMF. This co-operation leads to
a more structural approach to adjustment as compared to the former IMF
standby programs. But programs under SAF or FSAF arrangements are still
expected to achieve a substantial strengthening of the balance of payments
position within the rather short three-year program period.
Furthermore, the facilities do not include provisions to restrict debt
servicing during the program period. For many programs to be successfull
it will be necessary to determine a ceiling of debt servicing as a
percentage of export earnings or government expenditure. These percentages
could be raised once the adjustment policy starts to yield results in
terms of traded goods production. Apart from the financial support from
IMF and World Bank, a country like Zambia needs donor support to smooth
the adjustment process. This may help to avoid areas of conflict between
expenditure reduction and expenditure switching policies.48
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